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1. Introduction: The worst business 
proposition in the world
In 1965, the South Korean government 
decided to build a modern steel mill and ap-
plied for a loan from a consortium of potential 
donors (the US, UK, West Germany, France, 
and Italy). The idea was so outrageous that it 
can be called the worst business proposal in 
human history.
At the time, Korea was one of the poorest 
countries in the world, relying on natural re-
source-based exports (e.g., fish, tungsten ore) 
or labour-intensive manufactured exports (e.g., 
wigs made with human hair, cheap garments). 
According to the received theory of internation-
al trade, known as the theory of comparative 
advantage, a country like Korea, with a lot of 
labour and very little capital, should not have 
been making capital-intensive products, like 
steel.
Worse, Korea did not even produce the 
necessary raw materials. Sweden developed an 
iron & steel industry quite naturally because it 
has a lot of iron ore deposits. Korea produced 
virtually no iron ore or coking coal, the two key 
ingredients of modern steel-making. Today, 
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these could have been imported from China, 
but this was the time of the Cold War when 
there was no trade between China and South 
Korea. So the raw materials had to be import-
ed from countries like Australia, Canada, and 
the US – all of them five or six thousand miles 
away – thereby significantly adding to the cost 
of production.
To make it viable, the Korean government 
proposed to subsidise the steel mill left, right, 
and centre – free infrastructure (ports, roads, 
railroads), tax breaks, accelerated depreciation 
of its capital equipment (so that tax liabilities 
are minimised in the early years), reduced utility 
rates, and what not, thereby exactly proving 
the critics right that producing steel was not 
something that the country should be doing.
The Korean government proposed two 
more things that made the project look even 
less appealing. When the company to run the 
steel mill – the Pohang Iron and Steel Company 
(POSCO) – was set up in 1968, it was as a state-
owned enterprise (SOE), as there was no private 
sector company that was willing to take the risk. 
And to cap it all, the company was to be led by 
Mr. Park Tae-Joon, a former army general with 
minimal business experience as the head of a 
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state-owned tungsten-mining company for a 
few years. Even for a military dictatorship, this 
was going too far. The country was about to 
start the biggest business venture in its histo-
ry, and the man put in charge was not even a 
professional businessman!
Given all this, it was not a big surprise that all 
the potential donors pulled out of the negotia-
tions in 1969. The Korean government, however, 
managed to build the steel mill by persuading 
the Japanese government to channel a large 
chunk of the reparation payments that it was 
paying for its colonial rule (1910-45) into the 
steel-mill project and to provide the machines 
and the technical advice necessary for the mill. 
The company started production in 1973 and 
established its presence remarkably quickly. 
By the mid-1980s, it was considered one of the 
most cost-efficient producers of low-grade steel 
in the world. By the 1990s, it was one of the 
world’s leading steel companies. It was priva-
tised in 2001, not for poor performance, but for 
political reasons (ascendancy of neo-liberalism), 
and today is the fourth largest steel producer in 
the world (by the quantity of output).
2. Many more successful SOEs  
than you think
The story of POSCO is one of the most fasci-
nating success stories of a state-owned enter-
prise, but there are many other success stories. 
There are many world class firms that were set 
up and succeeded as a SOE, although privatised 
now – EMRAER, the Brazilian aircraft manu-
facturer that is the third largest in the world. 
Many world class firms are majority-owned 
SOEs – Singapore Airline (56%), Finnair (57%), 
Swisscom (57%), Statoil of Norway (67%), EDF 
of France (85%), and so on. There are many 
former SOEs in which the government still has 
a controlling stake (voting rights) by the gov-
ernment – Stora Enso of Finland (37%), Renault 
of France (30%), Commerzbank of Germany 
(25%), Volkswagen of Germany (19% owned 
by the state government of Niedersachsen, or 
Lower Saxony, but with a ‘veto’ right through 
the so-called Volkswagen Law).
Many countries have achieved impressive 
economic development with very heavy SOE 
presence. France and Austria produced 13-15% 
GDP in SOEs until the 1980s (the world average 
in this regard was around 11% for 1978-91 pe-
riod, according to the World Bank estimate in 
Bureaucrats in Business). Taiwan produces 16% 
of GDP through SOEs and Singapore 22% even 
today. In contrast, many poorly-performing 
countries have small SOE sectors. Argentina 
produced only about 5% of GDP through SOEs 
even before the 1990s mass privatisation. The 
Philippines produces 2% of GDP through SOEs. 
Econometric studies have found no clear stas-
tical correlation between a country’s share of 
SOEs in GDP and its economic performance.
3. Arguments for and against SOEs
Now, in discussing the role of SOEs, we 
should not forget that there are many respect-
able theoretical cases for SOEs. First of all, there 
may be certain commodities which the society 
simply does not want to be produced and trad-
ed according to profit motives – for example, 
water, healthcare, blood, basic education, arms. 
Second, there are equity considerations: such 
as the provision of universal access to ‘essential 
services’ (e.g., water, postal service), job creation 
in backward areas, and more active affirmative 
actions for women and minorities in the state 
sector. Third, SOEs may be better able to take 
various forms of market failures (e.g., exter-
nalities, public goods) into consideration in 
making decisions. Last but not least, SOEs may 
be a convenient way to reduce political and 
administrative costs. For example, state oper-
ation of basic inputs industries (e.g., fertiliser) 
allows subsidisation of private producers who 
generate externalities without having to raise 
taxes in the first place.
Of course, there are arguments that say that 
state-owned enterprises will be inefficient and 
they need to be taken seriously.
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The most prominent of these arguments is 
based on the so-called principal-agent argu-
ment. It says that, since a SOE is by definition run 
by somebody who does not own it, its manager 
would have no incentive to run it efficiently. The 
owners (in this case, the general public) cannot 
monitor and sanction their agents (i.e., the SOE 
managers) because they cannot fully know how 
much efforts the agents have made – this is the 
case of asymmetric information.
However, any enterprise which is not run by 
the owner-manager, and not just public enter-
prises, has the same principal-agent problem. 
Especially when the ownership is dispersed, 
there is a problem of collective action among 
the shareholders in monitoring. The improved 
enterprise performance is a ‘public good’ in the 
sense that even those who did not devote their 
efforts to monitoring the performance of the 
managers can benefit from it. This means that 
no one will have the incentive to devote time 
and energy to monitor the managers, because 
the gains are ‘public’ while the costs are ‘private’. 
Moreover, under certain circumstances, it may 
be easier to monitor SOEs than to monitor pri-
vate sector firms with dispersed ownership. In 
the SOE sector, there is often one, or, at most a 
few, clearly identifiable agencies responsible 
for monitoring SOE performance (e.g., relevant 
ministries, public holding companies, govern-
ment audit board, dedicated SOE supervisory 
agency), whereas dispersed shareholders of 
private enterprises typically do not have such 
agency.
The second problem with the princi-
pal-agent framework is that the assumption of 
total self-seeking behind it is wrong. Human 
motivations are diverse. Indeed, if everyone 
is totally self-interested as depicted in the 
standard principal-agent models, it will not be 
possible to run any large, complex organisation, 
public or private, due to excessive monitoring 
costs. Large organisations can function properly 
only if its members are not totally self-seeking 
and have high degree of organisational loyalty, 
commitment to their colleagues, pride in their 
work, and other ‘intrinsic’ motivations.
In addition to the principal-agent theory, 
there are arguments saying that SOEs are inef-
ficient because they are not subject to market 
discipline: SOEs are often statutory monopolies 
and thus not subject to product market com-
petition; they are not subject to the discipline 
of the capital market in the sense that they do 
not go bankrupt or are subject to the threat of 
takeover.
However, these arguments have to be taken 
with a grain of salt. Many private firms are also 
monopolies and thus are not subject to product 
market discipline. SOEs are also open to the 
threat of bankruptcy and takeover, although 
not usually through the capital market – there 
are regular changes of public enterprise man-
agement due to bad performance, which are 
equivalent to takeover and there are many 
examples of liquidation of inefficient public 
enterprises, which are equivalent to bankruptcy 
(the UK, Italy, Israel, Korea, Ivory Coast, Brazil, 
and Singapore). SOEs may have more of ‘soft 
budget constraint’, but this often has more to 
do with their size than their ownership – this is 
proven by the fact that bail-out of large private 
sector firms are often organised by rightwing, 
rather than leftwing, governments (see all the 
examples in the powerpoint).
Moreover, the capital market discipline ar-
gument assumes that capital markets function 
well, but there is plenty of evidence against 
the assumption. It is well established that size, 
rather than efficiency, of a firm is the most 
important determinant for its exposure to the 
threat of takeover. Enterprise performance does 
not necessarily improve after takeover. Even 
when it works well in its own terms, capital 
market discipline may produce socially unde-
sirable outcomes; it leads to ‘short-termism’, 
as clearly shown by the 2008 global financial 
crisis. Forms of enterprise restructuring other 
than through the takeover mechanism (e.g., 
bank-led enterprise restructuring as practiced 
in Japan or Germany, state-mediate restructur-
ing in Korea in the 1970s and the 1980s) may 
be more efficient.
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4. What is the evidence?
If there are theoretical arguments on both 
sides, then, what is the evidence?
Studies often do not fully take into account 
non-ownership factors which affect enterprise 
performance, especially enterprise size (that is, 
often incompatible firms are compared). But 
from those few studies which do control for 
non-ownership determinants of enterprise per-
formance, no clear general evidence emerges 
for against SOEs. There is also a ‘sampling bias’ 
in the sense that very few studies for countries 
where SOEs are efficient (e.g., Singapore), 
whereas there are a lot of studies on countries 
where SOEs are not doing well (e.g., India).
Saying that there is no general case against 
SOEs does not mean that their performances 
do not need any improvement. What it means, 
however, is that privatization is not necessarily 
going to be the solution. And indeed there are 
many other ways to improve SOE performance.
In discussing privatization, we need to first 
bear in mind that the choice is not ‘all or noth-
ing’. There are many intermediate solutions. 
The government can sell some of the shares 
of a SOE while retaining majority control or a 
controlling stake (most SOEs are of this form 
these days). Such ‘partial’ privatization may be 
done in order to raise revenues, but it is also 
done in order to gain access to key technolo-
gies or key markets through partnership with 
a major foreign company. Some governments 
have utilized the so-called ‘golden share’ to re-
tain control over key matters (e.g., control over 
key technology, M&A) while selling almost all 
its stake (e.g., EMBRAER). Or the government 
can retain its whole or majority ownership and 
contract out management in certain sectors 
(tourist hotels are the best examples in this 
regard).
Evidence shows that privatization of profit-
able SOEs makes little difference to their per-
formances, so the government should focus on 
privatizing unprofitable SOEs. Unfortunately, 
the private sector is not very interested in 
buying unprofitable SOE. Therefore, in order 
to generate private sector interest in a poorly-
performing SOE, the government often has to 
invest heavily in it and/or restructure it. This 
raises a dilemma – if SOE performance can be 
thus improved while in state ownership, why 
privatize in the first place?
Indeed, there is evidence that gains in 
productivity in privatized enterprises usually 
occur before privatization through anticipatory 
restructuring. This suggests that restructuring 
is more important than privatization. Therefore, 
unless it is politically impossible to restructure 
an enterprise without a strong government 
commitment to privatization, a lot of problems 
in the SOEs may be solved through restructur-
ing without privatization.
Moreover, the very process of privatization 
involves financial expenditure (valuation, 
flotation, etc.). This is especially a problem for 
developing countries, as the process has to be 
managed by expensive international account-
ing firms and investment banks (developing 
countries that do not have such firms domes-
tically). Privatization can also put an excessive 
burden on the regulatory capabilities of the 
government, especially if done on a large scale 
or if regulation is given to local governments (as 
they have lower capabilities). When the SOEs 
concerned are natural monopolies, privatiza-
tion may replace inefficient but restrained pub-
lic monopoly with inefficient and unrestrained 
private monopoly, in the absence of adequate 
regulation.
Corruption inside SOEs is often used as an 
argument for privatization. However, the pro-
cesses of privatization have been often corrupt 
– sometimes illegal (e.g., bribery, insider trad-
ing) but often legal (e.g., government ‘insiders’ 
acting as hidden consultants). As a result, the 
corrupt have often pushed through privatiza-
tion at all costs, because it means they do not 
have to share the bribery with their successors 
and can ‘cash in’ all future bribery streams. A 
government that is unable to control corruption 
in SOEs is not suddenly going to have the ca-
pacity to prevent it when it is privatizing them. 
Finally, it should also be added that privatization 
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will not necessarily reduce corruption, as private 
sector firms can be corrupt too.
It should also be pointed out that the tim-
ing and the scale of privatization matter. For 
example, trying to sell many enterprises within 
a relatively short period – the so-called “fire 
sale” approach – weakens the government’s 
bargaining power, thus lowering the proceeds it 
gets. Trying to privatize when the stock market 
is down may force the government to lower 
prices, so setting a rigid deadline for privatiza-
tion is a bad idea. There is also a need to get the 
privatisation contract right. The contract needs 
to have arrangement for reclaiming assets when 
the purchaser extracts profit and walks away. 
There is also the need to set the right perfor-
mance requirements.
5. What is to be done?
If privatisation has all these potential prob-
lems, what else can be done?
First of all, we can reform the way in which 
objectives of SOEs are chosen and prioritised. 
SOEs often serve multiple objectives. There 
is nothing wrong with this, but, often the 
objectives are not clearly specified, there are 
too many objectives, and the hierarchy among 
these often conflicting objectives are left un-
clear. Thus, we need to clarify the objectives, 
reduce their numbers, and establish a clear 
hierarchy among them.
Second, there is a need to improve the 
quality of information available to the agencies 
monitoring the SOEs (e.g., dedicated monitor-
ing agency, holding company, government 
ministries). In doing this, clear lines and sched-
ules of reporting need to be established in order 
to monitor and improve performance without 
the government engaging in micro-manage-
ment. Also, the monitoring authorities’ ability 
to process information should be improved, 
as information without the ability to use it is 
meaningless.
Third, public sector compensations are often 
not related to performance. There is a clear need 
to link the manager and worker remuneration 
to performance. However, remuneration needs 
to be more broadly defined than monetary 
compensation.
Fourth, institutions that manage the SOEs 
need to be improved. Sometimes creating 
a special agency devoted to the monitoring 
of SOEs can improve monitorinig efficiency. 
Such agency can save duplication of efforts 
and resources. Being the sole agency it cannot 
‘pass the buck’ in relation to minotoring respon-
sibility. And there being just one monitoring 
agency, SOE managers are freed from excessive 
inspection, which can happen when there are 
multiple agencies. Having said that, checks and 
balances needed against such agency, as it can 
become too powerful. Reducing the number 
of SOEs to supervise by liquidating and merg-
ing enterprises can also increase monitoring 
efficiency.
Fifth, competition can be increased. More 
competition is not necessarily better under 
all circumstances, but there is evidence that 
competition is more important in determining 
enterprise performance than ownership. For 
example, we can increase competition among 
SOEs, as Korea did by setting up a new state-
owned telecommunication company that 
competed with the existing SOE in providing 
international call services in the 1980s. The 
increased competition could be provided by 
liberalising a sector dominated by private enter-
prises and let it compete with a SOE supplying 
a partial substitute – this is what happened in 
the UK in the 1980s following the liberalisation 
of bus services, which then competed with the 
state-owned rail company. Or the government 
can push SOEs to export, which will force them 
to compete with private (and state-owned) 
firms from foreign countries in foreign markets; 
this is what the Korean government did with 
POSCO in the 1970s.
Finally, we need to think about political 
reform. Often, public enterprises are used as 
a means to redistribute income to politically 
favoured groups; political appointment of par-
ty loyalists, creation of employment in certain 
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regions (Italy) or for certain ethnic groups 
(white workers in South Africa under apartheid). 
Under certain circumstances, this practice may 
be justified, but it is often done to such a scale 
that it seriously damages the economy. Getting 
rid of such political patronage may be the most 
important, albeit most difficult, remedy for SOE 
inefficiency in some countries.
6. Concluding Remarks
The debates on the role of SOEs in the 
economy and on the role of privatisation as 
a remedy to the problems of SOEs have been 
heavily tinged by ideological biases – mostly 
biases against SOEs in the recent period. This 
short essay shows how the reality is a lot more 
complex.
There are many different theories for and 
against SOEs, all with some elements of truths 
and all theories requiring very nuanced and 
context-dependent interpretation. The em-
pirical evidence is also complex. There are 
many examples of excellent SOEs, as well as 
those of very poor ones, and there is no clear 
systematic statistical correlation between the 
size of a country’s SOE sector and its economic 
performance.
Privatisation is but one solution to the prob-
lems of SOEs and not even necessarily the most 
effective one. Privatisation is in itself an expen-
sive process that is also open to corruption. Its 
timing, scale, and design can seriously affect 
its outcome. Moreover, partial privatisation, 
contracting-out of management, reform of the 
internal structure of SOEs (objectives, remuner-
ation, information flows, etc.), restructuring of 
the monitoring mechanism, increased compe-
tition, political reform are all measures that may 
sometimes be more effective than privatisation.
The former Chinese leader, Deng Xiaop-
ing, once famously said that he does not care 
whether the cat is black or white as far as it 
catches mice. The problems of SOEs need to be 
approached in that pragmatic spirit; we should 
try to assess the merits and demerits of a SOE 
without any prejudice for or against public 
ownership and implement solutions that are 
the best for that enterprise.
